The cognitive theory of emotional disorders developed by Beck (
1) has been enormously influential in psychiatry (
2-
4). Hypotheses about the relationship between cognition and emotion that were derived from this theory have led to a greater understanding of many psychopathological states, and to an effective treatment modality, i.e., cognitive behavioral therapy, which has impressively shaped the psychiatry literature ever since (
5-
8). Beck’s cognitive theory posits that mood states may be discriminated on the basis of their unique cognitive contents (
1,
9). According to the cognitive content specificity hypothesis, automatic thoughts and subjectively perceived emotional states should be positively related (
10-
12).
Beck’s theory of emotional disorder suggests that negative automatic thoughts (NATs) and the underlying schemata affect one’s way of interpreting situations and result in maladaptive coping strategies (
1,
13). This theory proposes a three-layer cognitive structure, where NATs are topographically located on the outermost surface. NATs are the most easily accessible cognitions, and they tend to be the easiest to work on with patients during therapy sessions. NATs distort reality, are emotionally distressing, and interfere with patients’ functionality. Depending on their content and meaning, NATs are associated with specific emotions, and since they are usually quite brief, patients are often more aware of the emotions they feel (
13). This relationship between cognition and emotion, therefore, is thought to form the background of the cognitive content specificity hypothesis.
Before cognitive variables were described in a taxonomy by Kendall and Ingram (
14), there was confusion about the use of the term cognitive content specificity. Yet, now the term is more widely accepted as “a more specific claim that certain themes of semantic content in self-reported automatic thoughts are unique to either depression or anxiety” (
15). Although other theories have attempted to explain the cognitive content specificity, e.g., the self-discrepancy theory by Higgins (
16), the most investigated formulation to date has been the hypothesis by Beck (
9). After the development of an assessment tool to discriminate between depressive and anxious cognitions, i.e., the cognition checklist (CCL) (
10), research aiming to improve the differential diagnosis of mood and anxiety disorders has increased substantially (
12,
15,
17-
25). Researchers focusing on cognitive content specificity have suggested that instruments like the CCL might be an alternative to make a diagnostic distinction between depression and anxiety. This suggestion stemmed from clinical observations demonstrating that depressive cognitive content was focused on themes related to negative self-evaluation, hopelessness, and pessimism about the future (
9,
26,
27), whereas anxious cognitive content was more focused on physical or psychological threat, and an inability to cope with danger (
26,
28). Another way of differentiating depressive and anxious cognitive content was proposed to be associated with the temporal focus of cognitions, where depressive cognitions were more likely to be past-oriented, and anxious cognitions future-oriented (
29).
A meta-analysis on the cognitive content specificity hypothesis concluded that the hypothesis was only supported for depressive cognitive content (
15). The authors argued that anxious cognitive content’s poor performance in demonstrating specificity might be due to the possibility that (i) anxious cognitive content might not be specific to anxiety and (ii) the themes involved in anxious cognitive content might be shared variables between depression and anxiety. This is further supported by studies using prototypical cognitions to distinguish different diagnostic categories (
18,
30) and on positive and negative affectivity (
24,
26,
31,
32).
Currently available measures to assess negative cognitions in depression or anxiety for adults are limited. In addition to the CCL (
10), the literature review provided us with the following measures: (i) the automatic thoughts questionnaire (ATQ) (
33), (ii) the Crandell cognitions inventory (CCI) (
34), (iii) the anxious self-statements questionnaire (ASSQ) (
35), (iv) the UBC cognitions inventory (UBC-CI) (
30), (v) the agoraphobic cognitions questionnaire (ACQ) (
36), and (vi) the body sensations questionnaire (BSQ) (
36). These questionnaires, except for the ATQ, the CCI, and the depression subscale in the UBC-CI, focus on thematically related cognitions to anxiety, whereas the former questionnaires focus solely on depressive cognitions. Apart from the UBC-CI, which has both subscales for depression and anxiety, the CCL is, therefore, unique in that it consists of two different subscales focused on depressive or anxious cognitions. The anxiety subscale (CCL-A) has less prototypical items in the sense that they do not particularly represent core features of the aspects of specific anxiety disorders. Therefore, these items may be classified as general in terms of anxiety related cognitions, i.e., future-oriented threat. The UBC-IC, however, consists of more prototypical and disorder-specific anxiety subscales, e.g., worry, panic, somatic preoccupation, and social fear. This distinction might position the CCL-A as a more transdiagnostic perspective on anxiety, whereas the specific anxiety subscales of the UBC-IC might be more relevant for research involving disorder-specific approaches to anxiety. The depression subscale of the CCL (CCL-D), as reported in the literature (
15), may also be conceptualized as disorder specific in the sense that its items reflect the core aspects of depression.
The CCL was initially developed to differentiate anxiety and depression and to measure the frequency of automatic thoughts (
10). It was initially thought to explicitly test the cognitive content specificity hypothesis of the cognitive model (
1,
27). Its psychometric properties indicate that it is a reliable and valid tool. Cronbach’s α values range from 0.90 - 0.91 to 0.92 - 0.93 in psychiatric outpatients and 0.86 and 0.90 in students, for the CCL-A and CCL-D, respectively. It has also been shown to have high test-retest reliability and concurrent validity with scales measuring depression and anxiety severity (
10,
37). The subscales have also demonstrated evidence for discriminant validity, differentiating patients diagnosed with depression or anxiety (
10,
37). The results have also indicated that the CCL-D and CCL-A are moderately correlated with each other, which might be due to the shared variance between the subscales (
37). Factor analytic studies have generally revealed that the CCL consists of two subscales, which correspond to depression and anxiety related negative cognitions (
10,
37,
38), although some findings differ (
19). Apart from these initial studies, later research has also consistently reported that the CCL is a reliable and valid tool for research purposes (
39-
41).