Following the official announcement of the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran on February 19, 2019, and the need for a collective synergy among all government sectors and society, the outbreak reached the highest political priority (
19). The multi-sectoral National COVID-19 Committee (NCC) was established during the first days of the pandemic, comprising a range of relevant ministries and other departments (
Table 2) (
19). This was the initiation of inter-sectoral collaboration and implementation of the WoG approach to combat COVID-19 in Iran. Iran has a centralized government, and all rules and regulations are issued by the central government and implemented throughout the country. Therefore, NCC has the main responsibility of responding to the outbreak in the country via the issuance of mandates throughout the country. The NCC approved several preventive measures, including the closure of schools, educational centers, shopping centers, borders, and bazaars, as well as the cancellation of public events, including Friday prayers and religious and funeral ceremonies, and restriction of internal and international travels to control virus transmission (
18). Nonetheless, Iran has faced seven waves of the COVID-19 pandemic so far, each one more devastating than the previous wave. The inadequate political will to fully implement the WoG-WoS approach in the right manner might be the main reason, we believe, that compelled Iran to face more severe consequences compared to some other countries (
20-
22). For instance, no public representative was a member of the NCC, and the capacity of civil society was not meaningfully utilized to reach people for training and preparation. Moreover, disappointingly, the NCC believed that herd immunity would protect most exposed to the virus (
23,
24).
Multi-sectoral collaboration is the key to the fight against the complexity of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the NCC had diverse membership, it did not establish formal multidisciplinary working groups that represent all relevant sectors and stakeholders for providing evidence-informed and efficient strategies (
18). Most notably, as the symbol of multisectoral collaboration for health, the capacity of the Supreme Council for Health and Food Security (SCHFS) was not meaningfully utilized in materializing the WoG-WoS approach. Chaired by the president and its secretariat within the MOHME, the SCHFS has the potential to align the private sector and community representatives for the policy-making process, for instance, through the establishment of national and sub-national health assemblies. Such capacity for bringing people into decision-making for health, applying health in all policies, and fostering the WoG-WoS approach was not meaningfully utilized to control the crisis (
25).
COVID-19 was, especially during its first 18 months into the pandemic, full of obscurities. Hence, the need to produce reliable evidence in biological, social, human, and other aspects is vital to combat the pandemic. Academic institutions are at the center of producing evidence (
26,
27). In this regard, the scientific sub-committee of the NCC was set up to use scientific evidence in formulating COVID-19 policies. Nonetheless, the composition of the sub-committee was skewed towards a few selected clinicians and epidemiologists, where other relevant expertise, including health economics, health policy, public policy, psychology, sociology, communication science, information technology, etc., were overlooked (
2). The NCC did not establish an organic communication line with the National Institutes of Health Research (NIHR), which is the health system observatory of Iran, for producing evidence and regular monitoring of the implemented strategies (
2). More disappointingly, the capacity of the extensive primary health care (PHC) network was not fully utilized to bring COVID-19 services closer to the communities, conduct effective tracing and testing, and reduce hospitalization (
28).