A total of 594 papers in the search process were screened for eligibility. Of these 594 papers, 26 papers were finally included.
Table 1 displays summary information for each study (year, country/city, study design, and sample size) and
Table 2 displays factors associated with irrational prescriptions of medicine.
| First Author | Years | Country/City | Designa | Sample |
|---|
| Wilensky (12) | 1983 | Virginia | 4 | - |
| Cockburn (19) | 1997 | Australia | 3 | 22 GPs, 336 of their patients |
| Britten and Ukoumunne (21) | 1997 | London | 2 | 544 unselected patients consulting 15 GPs |
| Izumidia et al. (22) | 1999 | Japan | 3 | Not Mention |
| Britten and Ukoumunne (23) | 2000 | UK | 2 | 20 GPs, 35 consulting patients |
| Gosden et al. (15) | 2001 | Denmark | 1 | Six studies that compared fee-for-service, capitation, salary or target payments |
| Ely et al. (24) | 2002 | USA | 2 | 9 academic GPs, 14 family doctors, 2 medical librarians |
| Delattr and Dormont (5) | 2003 | Switzerland | 2 | 4500 French self-employed physicians |
| Madden et al. (25) | 2005 | Ireland | 5 | 20,466 individuals aged 16 years and over |
| Blomqvist and Leger (26) | 2005 | Singapore | 3 | Not Mention |
| Akkerman et al. (27) | 2005 | Netherlands | 3 | 146 GPs included all patients during a 4 week period in the winter of 2002/2003 |
| Doran et al. (28) | 2005 | Australia | 2 | 33 in-depth interviews from all adult age groups |
| Coenen et al. (29) | 2006 | Belgium | 3 | 85 Flemish GPs |
| Brekke and Kuhn (18) | 2006 | Germany | 3 | Two pharmaceutical firms |
| Manchikanti (30) | 2007 | Louisville | 4 | - |
| Devlin and Sarma (31) | 2008 | Canada | 3 | 2004 Canadian National Physician |
| Leonard et al. (32) | 2009 | Belgium | 1 | 25 papers |
| Reynolds and McKee (17) | 2009 | China | 2 | 24 patients, 11 village doctors, 26 health workers, two independent pharmacists, two village leaders, and three family planning officials |
| Dusansky and Koc (33) | 2010 | Austin | 3 | Not mention |
| Manchikanti (30) | 2010 | India | 2 | Three FGDs with 36 prescribers |
| Amporfu (34) | 2011 | Ghana | 3 | 2045 (1587patients received treatment from public hospitals and 458patients in private hospitals ) |
| Yousefi et al. (35) | 2012 | Iran | 2 | 15 GPs |
| Mao et al. (36) | 2013 | China | 4 | - |
| Teixeira Rodrigues et al. (37) | 2013 | Portugal | 1 | 35 papers |
| Soleymani et al. (38) | 2013 | Iran | 3 | 144 pharmacists |
| Chen et al. (39) | 2014 | Chin | 3 | 8,258 prescriptions in 2007 and 8,278 prescriptions in 2010, from 83 primary health care facilities |
| Clemens and Gottlieb (40) | 2014 | Canada | 2 | 2915 patients |
aStudy design: 1, systematic review; 2, qualitative; 3, quantitative; 4, review; 5, working paper.
| First Author (Country) | Demand to Prescribe | Patient’s Expectations | Inaccurate Diagnosis | Inadequate Awareness and Knowledge | Information Asymmetry | Poor Medical Education | Physician’s Attitude | Poor Medical Knowledge | Low Experience | Physician-to-Population Ratio | Increase Follow-Up Visits | Physician-Patient Relationship | Fee-for-Service | Insurance Reimbursements | Insurance Coverage | Out-of-Pocket | Medicine Subside | Medicine Advertisement | Ineffective Monitoring Programs | Lack of Regulation on Prescription | Financial Incentives | Lack of clinical guidance | Medicines Near-Expiry Dates or Expired | prescription Supervision |
|---|
| Wilensky and Rossiter (12) | + | | | | | | | | | + | + | | + | + | + | + | | | | | | | | |
| Cockburn and Pit (19) | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Britten and Ukoumunne (21) | | + | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Izumidia et al. (22) | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | |
| Britten and Ukoumunne (23) | | | + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gosden et al. (15) | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ely et al. (24) | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Delattre and Dormont (5) | | | | | | | | | | + | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Madden et al. (25) | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Blomqvist andLeger (26) | | | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | + | | | | | | | | |
| Akkerman et al. (27) | | + | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Doran et al. (28) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | |
| Coenen et al. (29) | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Brekke and Kuhn (18) | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | |
| Manchikanti (30) | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | |
| Devlin and Sarma (31) | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Leonard et al. (32) | | | | | | | | | | + | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reynolds and McKee (17) | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | + | | |
| Dusansky and Koc (33) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | |
| Kotwani et al. (41) | | + | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | + | | + | |
| Amporfu (34) | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yousefi et al. (35) | | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | + |
| Mao et al. (36) | | | | + | | | | | + | | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | |
| Teixeira Rodrigues (37) | | | + | + | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Soleymani et al. (38) | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chen et al. (39) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | |
| Clemens and Gottlieb (40) | + | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | + | | | | | + | | | |
Four studies have been performed to investigate the physician- induced demand and its related factors (
5,
12,
22,
34). Wilensky et al. in 1983, reviewed the findings from a series of studies on induced demand from the national medical care expenditure survey of the national center for health services research. They reported that induced demand was due to factors as demand for medical care by patients, physician-to-population ratio, increasing physician-initiated visits, physician-initiated health services, reimbursement system, insurance reimbursements, insurance coverage, and the share of the bill paid out-of-pocket by the patient (
12). Also, Izumidia, in a study on examining the physician-induced demand hypothesis, adopted the expenditure function approach and showed that physician-population ratio and self-payment price are influencing factors initiating the demand for unnecessary services (
22). Amporfu, in examining the supplier-induced demand, compared the changes in demands for health care services in the public and private hospitals and reported that unnecessary visits, especially follow-up visits, increased the irrational use of medicines (
34).
Three studies have been conducted to examine the effects of patient’s expectations and demands for medication (
19,
21,
29). Evidence suggests that prescribing behavior is influenced by patient’s expectations. Coenen et al. in a study on the impact of patient’s demand for prescription of antibiotic, showed that when GPs perceived patient’s demand, there was a higher incidence of prescription of antibiotic (
29).
Three qualitative studies investigated knowledge, attitudes, and practices in physician prescription (
17,
23,
24). Britten and Ukoumunne conducted interviews with participants to assess factors associated with decisions GPs make in prescribing medicine. Their results showed that inaccurate diagnosis and the patient’s inadequate cooperation with the physician in the visits are associated with inappropriate decisions in prescribing medicine (
23). Ely et al. conducted interviews with participants to describe obstacles in the appropriate medical practice and reported that gap in knowledge and lack of physician awareness were 2 main obstacles for rational prescription (
24). Reynolds et al. in a semi-structured interview, assessed knowledge, attitudes, and practices in prescribing antibiotics and reported that certain factors motivated the physicians to initiate an unnecessary prescription of antibiotic such as: speed up patient’s recovery, financial incentives, and incomplete national guidance (
17).
Three studies have examined the impact of the payment system on physician practices (
15,
25,
31). All 3 studies suggested that fee-for-service provides a higher quantity of health care services compared with physicians paid by capitation and salary. Madden et al. in a study on determining the relation between payment system for GPs and visiting rates, found out that the physicians who were paid on a fee-for-service method, behaved in their own economic self-interests and had higher visiting rates and more utilization of health care services (
25).
Two studies assessed the interaction between insurance and health services consumption as well as demand (
26,
33). Blomqvist and Leger in a study assessing the interaction between insurance and health services utilization, found out that in the context where the doctors were paid by capitation and patients who paid only part of the cost of their health services, the physician practice was significantly influenced by information asymmetry, patient cost sharing and fee-for-service payment method (
26). Dusansky, in a study, assessed the effects of the interaction between insurance choice and medical service demand and reported that an increase in price for medical services led to a decrease in the request for medical services and also an increase in the request for more insurance coverage. However, the increase in insurance coverage increased the demand for medical services (
33).
A total of 7 studies investigated effective factors on irrational prescription of medicine (
27,
30,
35-
38,
41). Akkerman et al. in a study, assessed determining factors of over-prescribing of antibiotics using the Dutch national guidelines as a benchmark. They reported that overestimation of the symptoms by physicians and patients’ expectations could be the most important determinants of overprescribing (
27). Manchikanti reviewed the facts on the overuse of medicine and found out that lack of education about the factors involved in unnecessary medication for physicians, pharmacists, and the public; and ineffective monitoring programs were important factors for overuse of medicine (
30). Kotwani et al. conducted a qualitative study to examine the factors effective in prescribing antibiotics by primary care physicians in Delhi. They used 3 focus group discussions to explore the views of primary care physicians in both private and public sectors. They found out that the significant factors for antibiotic prescriptions were inaccurate diagnosis, patient’s expectation and demand, sustainability in practice, financial incentives, and physician’s inadequate knowledge. They reported 2 additional factors in the public sector, such as: prescribing overstocked and near-expiry date antibiotics to save money as well as spending inadequate time with the patient to visit more patients (
41).
Yousefi et al. in a study, conducted interviews with GPs to assess effective reasons on the irrational prescription of Corticosteroids and found that the effective factors in irrational prescription were lack of physician awareness, physician-patient relationship, inadequate accessibility of alternative medicines, and poor supervision on the prescriptions (
35). Mao et al. in a review study, discussed the situation of irrational use of medicines, suggested that lack of knowledge in providers and patients fee-for-service payment were the factors involved in the irrational use of medicine (
36).
Teixeira Rodrigues et al. in a systematic review about the physician’s opinions on influencing factors for antibiotic prescribing, found out that physician’s attitudes, patients’ expectations, demand for previous clinical practice, poor education in university, lack of continuous medical education and years of experience, and clinical practice could interfere with appropriate prescription (
37). Soleymani et al. in a cross‑sectional study, used a pre‑designed questionnaire in a convenient sampling of pharmacists to analyze the pharmacists’ viewpoints about the main factors of rational use of medicine and reported that the most important determinant was the lack of public knowledge and awareness about the appropriate use of medicines (
38).
Two studies have examined the impact of economics incentives on the physician’s behavior (
39,
40). Clemens et al. in a study, developed a model of physicians’ joint supply and investment decisions and concluded that the health care supply was influenced by patient’s demand, fee-for-service, out-of-pocket, and financial incentives (
40).
Brekkea et al. in a study, investigated the effects of advertising on the use of medicine in the market. Their results showed that advertising could increase unnecessary visits to the physicians overloading physician’s services, and consequently initiating unnecessary prescription (
18).
Leonard et al. in a systematic review, assessed the correlation between doctor density and health care consumption. The results showed a significant positive correlation between doctor density and health care consumption. An increase in the number of doctors increased physician-induced demand and increased follow-up visits (
32).