Health budget constraints, increasing new expensive life-saving drugs, and enhanced public health expectations have increasingly required manufacturers to prove the value of their drugs for payers and budget holders. However, the available evidence at the time of drug registration is often insufficient to accurately estimate the clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, or budgetary impact of a drug in the real world (
1-
3). Although the efficacy of drugs is approved through clinical trials, their effectiveness and utilization in the real world are uncertain before marketing (
4). This uncertainty may lead to delayed decision-making in terms of access and reimbursement (
5). Delay in reimbursement and the risk of rejection for inclusion in the positive list may discourage the industries from investing in new innovative medicines with high risk and low market potential, like orphan drugs or personalized medicines (
6,
7).
Several policies are implemented worldwide to manage and confine such uncertainties (
8). The best solution for passing this hurdle is a formal institutional agreement between pharmaceutical companies and payers to share the associated risks deriving from the administration of innovative pharmaceutical technologies (
9). This approach varies from traditional reimbursement methods in which healthcare payers accept almost all risks (
10). Various names are used to introduce and describe this general plan, such as risk sharing agreement (RSA), Performance-based risk sharing agreement (PBRSA), and patient access scheme (PAS), all of which are recently summarized with the concept of managed entry agreement (MEA), the name we adopted in this article (
2). These contracts are applied for various purposes in different countries; however, the main benefits of these contracts include accelerated access to new drugs, fast reimbursement of new drugs, real-world evidence generation, and dealing with uncertainties (
9).
Although all of these agreements aim to accelerate patients' access by sharing the risks, there are significant contrasts between their main categories, such as "financial-based," "outcome-based," and "coverage with evidence development" (
1). The arrangements falling within the first category may include price-volume agreements, discounts, and dose/time capping schemes. Controlling and managing budget impact based on financial metrics (e.g., total sales) or real-world utilization are the main objectives of these agreements. For example, in price-volume agreements, the price for each drug unit is determined in light of its sales. On the contrary, outcome-based agreements mainly include outcome guarantee, money-back guarantee, conditional treatment continuation, and process of care as the main types in this category that usually address uncertainty regarding the clinical and/or cost-effectiveness of new medicines. In addition, they play a significant role in managing budget impact and utilization.
Various mechanisms are used in different methods for achieving the above-mentioned aims. For instance, in outcome-guarantee agreements, payment is made only by patients who respond to treatments, and if a product fails to achieve an agreed-upon clinical result, the producer offers or agrees with rebates, refunds, or price changes if applicable. Positive coverage decision in the "coverage with evidence development" agreements is based on the collection of additional evidence (only with research or only in research), which might result in continuing, extended, or discontinued coverage (
1,
11,
12).
The growing application of such agreements in recent years is a response to the high price of new medicines (especially anti-cancer and orphan drugs), limited budget of health system payers despite rising costs, uncertainty around the clinical effectiveness of drugs in the real world, attention to patients' unmet medical needs, and acceleration and improvement of patients' access to new drugs (
13,
14). Although high-income countries implementing such agreements have considerable experience, limited experience is available in developing countries like Iran. The MEA has recently comprised one of the principal plans pursued to facilitate European patients' access (
15). In contrast, developing countries are less experienced in implementing such arrangements (
16). Ferrario et al. (
17) examined the implementation of MEAs in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, reporting that the most significant number of MEAs were implemented in Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, and Romania.
Conversely, Slovakia, Russia, Kosovo, and Albania did not have any MEA records when the study was conducted. Among the countries that did not have experience in implementing MEAs, Slovakia has taken a step towards implementing these agreements by changing the pricing and reimbursement legislation. However, based on federal law in Russia, all public purchases must be made through tenders, with the lowest price determining the winner, so there is no experience in this area. Although the private sectors in Russia have a different position, in theory, they deem MEAs too complicated for their routine needs and do not approach these agreements (
17).
Maskineh and Nasser (
18) explored the experience of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) regions in implementing MEAs for medical products. The results showed that only a few countries employed MEAs, which may be attributed to the lack of data collection infrastructure and insufficient expertise in health economics. At the same time, the study indicated that healthcare stakeholders had a positive attitude toward the potential of MEAs and projected an increase in their implementation to address budget impact while improving access to innovative drugs (
18). However, previously published articles did not consider MEA in Iran as a developing country in the MENA region.
Ansaripour et al. describes a systematic process of assessing, appraisal, and judging drug reimbursements in Iran that were overseen by the two most influential bodies, including the Iran Food and Drug Administration (IFDA) and the Supreme Council of Health Insurance (SCoHI) (
19). The organizations that offer health insurance in Iran are subsumed under three groups based on their functional nature. The first group, known as Social Health Insurance, covers about 90% of Iran's population and includes three main insurance funds – namely the Iran Health Insurance Organization (IHIO), the Social Security Organization (SSO), and the Armed Forces Medical Services Insurance Organization (AFHIO). These organizations generally cover 70% and 90% of the costs of outpatient and inpatient services, respectively. The second group, known as Institutional Health Insurance Funds, involves organizations like the Petroleum Industry Health Organization, the National Broadcasting Organization, and banks. Finally, the third group entails Commercial Health Insurance Organizations that work voluntarily and offer private supplemental insurance (
20). The process of reimbursement decision-making in Iran is associated with challenges, including budget constraints of the Iranian Insurance System and managing the recommendations of various stakeholders with different interests, leading to conflicts of interest and delays in reimbursement decisions, which, in turn, reduces patients' access to innovative drugs and increases out-of-pocket payments. These challenges highlight the necessity of applying new reimbursement policies (
19).
Although the Iranian SCoHI has adopted new policies in 2020, there is no formal experience in implementing MEAs in the field of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Iran. This has caused patients' reduced access to novel and costly drugs. The new policies incorporate some models of financial-based agreements (e.g., price-volume agreements and patient utilization cap), numbers of outcome-based agreements (e.g., outcome guarantee, money-back guarantee, and patient registry), and both models of coverage with evidence development (only with research or only in research). Before developing these new policies, the reference base pricing (RBP) and strategic purchasing were the main reimbursement policies applied in Iranian insurance organizations (
21).
Since the implementation of MEAs can affect the benefits of different stakeholders, seeking the insights of stakeholders can help in the optimal implementation of a new policy in the Iranian reimbursement system. The current study explored the principal stakeholders' opinions, including payers, manufacturers, and patients representatives. Our particular interest was to assess stakeholders' views on the objectives, pros, and cons of implementing MEAs in Iranian health insurance. The findings will hopefully help decision-makers enhance the process of implementing MEAs and improve their insights into the best pathway to pursue these policies.